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CLASSIFICATORY SORITES, PROBABILISTIC
SUPERVENIENCE, AND RULE-MAKING
DAMIR D. DZHAFAROV AND EHTIBAR N. DZHAFAROV
Abstract. We view sorites in terms of stimuli acting upon a system and
evoking this system’s responses. Supervenience of responses on stimuli im-
plies that they either lack tolerance (i.e., they change in every vicinity of
some of the stimuli), or stimuli are not always connectable by finite chains of
stimuli in which successive members are ‘very similar’. If supervenience does
not hold, the properties of tolerance and connectedness cannot be formulated
and therefore soritical sequences cannot be constructed. We hypothesize that
supervenience in empirical systems (such as people answering questions) is
fundamentally probabilistic. The supervenience of probabilities of responses
on stimuli is stable, in the sense that ‘higher-order’ probability distributions
can always be reduced to ‘ordinary’ ones. In making rules about which stimuli
ought to correspond to which responses, the main characterization of choices
in soritical situations is their arbitrariness. We argue that arbitrariness poses
no problems for classical logic.
1. Introduction
1.1. Overview. The purpose of this paper is to discuss and elaborate some aspects
of what we have called the behavioral approach to sorites Dzhafarov and Dzhafarov
(2010a,b). Here, the word ‘behavior’ is, perhaps, somewhat misleading, as we
understand it in a broader way than is usual: namely, as any input-output relation
in any system, not necessarily sentient or biological. The central feature of this
approach is that instead of being concerned with whether a certain object x has
a certain property P ‘in reality’, we deal with the question of whether a system
consistently responds to x in a particular way (which we then interpret as the
system assigning a certain property P to x).
Consider an example. Aliya has to choose between four answers in response to
being shown an object x (say a formation of grains of sand):
+ : ‘x is P ’,
− : ‘x is P ’,
± : ‘x is P and P ’,
· : ‘x is neither P nor P ’.
Here, P is some property (say, ‘a heap’) and P is its internal negation (‘something
other than a heap’). They are assumed to be understood by Aliya, although we do
not know exactly how. In the behavioral approach we need not worry exactly how,
insofar as Aliya follows the rules of responding we impose on her. Thus, she could
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have answered in many other ways, but we constrain her to choosing between these
particular four responses by the rules of responding.
1.2. Traditional versus behavioral approach. A traditional philosophical anal-
ysis would begin by translating the four responses to x into logical predicates
P ∗+(x),
P ∗−(x) = P
∗(x),
P ∗±(x) = P
∗(x) ∧ P ∗(x),
P ∗· (x) = ∼ P ∗(x)∧ ∼ P ∗(x).
Then the analysis would be directed to finding out whether the statement ‘P ∗+(x)’
is true or false (or anything else, if one allows for non-classical logics); or what its
truth value ought to be assuming the truth value of ‘P ∗−(x)’ is specified; or whether
it is possible that the statement ‘P ∗±(x)’ is true, etc. The analysis may lead to
distinguishing between different sorts of P s. Thus, compared to precise predicates,
such as ‘has amplitude A at wavelength w’, one may declare the vague ones, like
‘is a heap’, to have different logical relations with objects they apply to and with
other predicates.
In the behavioral approach we treat x as an input acting upon the system (in this
example, Aliya). Borrowing terminology from psychology, x may also be generically
referred to as a stimulus. Then+, −, ±, and · are four possible values of the system’s
output, or response. Our standing assumption here (elaborated upon below) shall
be that responses supervene on stimuli, i.e., that responses are given consistently.
In precise terms, this means that every instance of a given stimulus x is associated
with one and the same response r, so that there is a function pi (from the set of all
stimuli to the set of responses) such that
r = pi(x).
In our example, the relation pi(x) = r for any r ∈ {+,−,±, ·} is interpreted as
the fact that Aliya consistently assigns response r to x. One may then introduce a
predicate Pr(x) that holds if and only if pi(x) = r.
Let us compare the predicates Pr to the predicates P
∗
r of the traditional analy-
sis. The predicates P ∗r may very well be characterized as vague, and their theory
as glutty, gappy, or otherwise non-classical, but the predicates Pr are always well-
defined, and for each x, the statements ‘Pr(x)’ have definite classical truth values.
In particular, the predicates Pr are mutually exclusive and, assuming each stimulus
is associated with a response, mutually exhaustive. There is nothing vague about
Aliya’s maintaining that x has a certain vague property, nor even about her main-
taining that x has a classically contradictory property (say, being both red and not
red). In both cases she definitely assigns this response or definitely does not assign
it to a given x. In other words, while the logic or objective truth of the intended
meanings of Aliya’s responses (of the predicates P ∗r ) may in principle be arbitrary,
the supervenience assumption binds Aliya’s assignments of responses (the predi-
cates Pr) to classical logic. In the present example, if pi(x) = ± then we infer
that Aliya consistently assigns to x being a heap and being something other than
a heap. However, as + and − are different responses from ±, and pi(x) does not
equal either of the two, we infer neither that Aliya consistently assigns to x being a
heap, nor that she consistently assigns to x being something other than a heap. (In
fact, we infer the external negations of both these statements.) The disquotational
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principle applies here in its clearest form: the statement ‘Aliya consistently assigns
response r to x’ is true if Aliya consistently assigns response r to x, i.e., if Pr(x);
the statement is false if she does not, i.e., if ∼ Pr(x). Thus, we may conveniently
and innocuously confuse the predicates Pr(x) with the statements ‘Pr(x)’. By con-
trast, confusing P ∗r (x) with ‘P
∗
r (x)’ may be conceptually more demanding, as it
requires that one think of the objective reality of things like ‘a heap’ (Dummett,
1975; Unger, 1979; Wheeler, 1979).
1.3. The soritical trap. The reason we can get away with the behavioral approach
in dealing with sorites is that soritical reasoning can always be formulated in terms
of how a system’s consistent responses to different objects differ depending on how
these objects differ from each other. Specifically, all forms of the classificatory
sorites (as opposed to the comparative sorites; see our conclusion for the difference
between these two forms) are pivoted on the proposition that one and the same
response r should be given to stimuli x and y that are maximally or sufficiently
close, where this closeness is understood in some objective sense, external and
extraneous to the responding system. Thus, Aliya may be asked to theorize about
how she would respond to a sand formation y which differs by only one grain of
sand from another formation x, provided she has responded to x by r. Aliya may
be tempted to declare that she will not change her response because the difference
by one grain of sand is too small to make a difference. If she does, she will fall
into the standard soritical trap, and we will be able to construct a chain (soritical
sequence) x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn in which every two successive elements differ by one
grain of sand, and so by her own reasoning elicit the same response from Aliya, yet
x1 and xn differ by so many grains of sand (i.e., n is so large) that Aliya responds
differently to the two.
The supervenience assumption is not explicit in the soritical trap just described.
But if supervenience is violated, i.e., if the function pi is not well-defined, the soritical
trap cannot even be formulated, let alone ‘sprung’. Indeed, if Aliya has agreed
that she would respond to a stimulus y by r provided she responded to a very
similar x by r, she should certainly agree to do the same for y = x. After all,
nothing is more similar to x than another instance of x, under any reasonable
definition of similarity. The very possibility that one and the same formation of
sand may be a heap in one instance and not be a heap in another essentially
deprives the classical sorites argument of that which makes it the most compelling.
Supervenience is therefore an integral assumption, not merely a construct of the
behavioral approach, as its rejection means to end the discussion of sorites right
away. In point of fact, this may not be unreasonable given our common experience
that individuals indeed can and do change their responses over time. Aliya, being
human, may change her responses based on any number of factors, from the time
of day to her (presumably waning) interest in answering questions about sand.
She may even choose to answer randomly. But in such situations, as we argue
below, supervenience can be seamlessly reinstated by extending pi from individual
responses themselves to their probabilities. The ‘crux’ of dealing with the soritical
trap must thus lie elsewhere.
A technical complication here is that the value of pi(x) for a given x cannot
be established by a direct observation of what Aliya says in response to being
presented with the stimulus x. This value is a theoretical assumption that can be
corroborated, though not proved, by observing her responses to repeated instances
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of the same stimulus, x. Experimentally, such instances can be created either by
repeated presentations of x to Aliya under fixed or well-counterbalanced conditions,
or they can be created by observing the responses to x by many people considered
to be similar to Aliya (in relevant respects). Rather than getting into various
designs of such corroborating observations (they can be found in any textbook of
experimental design in behavioral and social sciences), we utilize the fact that this
is a philosophy paper and move to a more abstract plane of analysis. Whatever
method is used to collect this information, we can assume for our purposes here to
have access to it, as if from an infinity of parallel worlds in which we observed an
infinity of Aliyas decide about how to respond to x. If supervenience holds, be it
deterministic or probabilistic, then the value of pi(x) can be obtained from the said
information.
1.4. Plan. We will discuss below how the soritical trap is dissolved both on the
level of responding to stimuli (descriptive analysis) and on the level of making
rules about responding to stimuli (normative analysis). To repeat, everything in
this discussion can be expressed entirely in terms of what Aliya says or thinks she
would or should say in response to different sand formations, not about which of
these do or do not make a heap in reality. However, the behavioral approach and the
traditional one can be related through the assumption of a ‘competent responder’.
In our example, if the predicates P ∗r (x) are assumed to have objective truth values
(in the classical sense), then P (x) can be requested by the rules of responding to
have the same truth values, provided Aliya has all the relevant information about
x and can compute P ∗r (x). This means essentially that if Aliya is competent and
honest, then it will be the case that P ∗r (x) holds if and only if Pr(x) does. In
particular, if a soritical sequence can be formed in terms of P ∗r , it will then also be
formable in terms of Pr. But precisely because Pr is squarely within classical logic,
it admits no soritical sequences, whence neither does P ∗r .
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we outline the technical com-
ponents of our approach, and formally derive the impossibility of the existence of
soritical sequences. In Section 3, we illustrate the dissolution of the paradox for
systems where responses to stimuli are assumed to be deterministic, and in Sec-
tion 4 we do the same for probabilistic systems. In Section 5 we delve deeper into
the probabilistic model, and address a couple of natural concerns, including the
tempting but misguided idea to generalize it to an increasing hierarchy of proba-
bilities, each governed by the next. Finally, in Section 6, we address arbitrariness
and justifiability in connection with normative rules for responding to stimuli.
2. Basic Notions
2.1. Systems. To describe the soritical trap in formal terms, we begin by defining
a system S to be a structure (S,R, pi) in which S and R are sets and pi is a function
S → R. We interpret these components as follows:
• S is a set of inputs to which the system responds, generically referred to as
stimuli (but sometimes also as objects, points, etc., depending on context);
• R is a set of outputs, generically referred to as responses or stimulus-effects;
• pi is called a response or stimulus-effect function, and maps stimuli to their
(consistent) responses under the system.
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To use the example from the introduction, S can be the set of all possible formations
of sand in the world, and R the set {+,−,±, ·}. The assumption of the existence
of pi is our supervenience assumption, and we denote it Sup here. As noted above,
Sup is an implicit but fundamental piece of the soritical trap.
The generality of the above setup is apparent when one considers that each
system can give rise to many others, which may be more natural or useful in different
situations. For example, given a system S = (S,R, pi), we can consider instead a
system S ′ whose set of stimuli consists of finite sequences of elements of S. One
might prefer to work with this system if the response to a given stimulus x is
believed to depend not only on x itself, but also on the sequence of previously-seen
stimuli (as advocated, e.g., by Raffman, 2014).
2.2. Frechét spaces. We need next to formulate a notion of closeness between
two stimuli, a precise (and practical) generalization of when two formations of sand
differ by very few grains of sand. Contrary to one’s intuition, this requires nei-
ther the imposition of a metric on S (Williamson, 1994), nor even of a topology
(Weber and Colyvan, 2010). Our formalism (Dzhafarov and Dzhafarov, 2010a,b)
is pre-topological, and almost certainly as general as possible for this notion. A set
S is said to be endowed with Fréchet vicinities (and to form, together with them,
a Fréchet space) if every x ∈ S is associated with a nonempty collection Vx of
subsets of S containing x (our definition here is more restrictive than in Sierpinski
(1952)). The members of Vx are called the Fréchet vicinities of x, and closeness
can be defined in terms of them thus:
y ∈ S is close to x ∈ S in the sense of the Fréchet vicinity V ∈ Vx if y ∈ V .
A point x in a general Fréchet space may have one, several, or infinitely many
Fréchet vicinities, and a point y may be close to x in the sense of all, some, or none
of these. Importantly, x is close to itself in all possible senses (as it belongs to each
of its Fréchet vicinities, by definition). In our example, we may choose to let Vx
for each sand formation x have just one Fréchet vicinity, namely the set of all sand
formations that can be obtained from x by adding or removing one or fewer grains
of sand. This turns the set S of sand formations into a Fréchet space, and the only
sense in which two different formations can be considered close is if they differ by
a single grain. In the general case, unlike here, closeness need not be symmetric: y
can be close to x without x being close to y.
2.3. Tolerance. In the abstract, the definition of a Fréchet space is completely
independent of our notion of a system. We connect the two with the following
tolerance assumption, which we denote by Tol:
if S = (S,R, pi) is a system and S is endowed with Fréchet vicinities, then pi is
tolerant : it is constant on at least one Fréchet vicinity of each x ∈ S.
To agree that the function pi is tolerant is the main (explicitly stated, unlike Sup)
part of the classical soritical trap. For example, with vicinities assigned to sand
formations as above, the stimulus-effect function pi corresponding to Aliya’s assign-
ment of responses will, in view of her commitment to respond the same way to any
two sand formations that differ by a single grain of sand, satisfy Tol: it will be
constant on each x’s unique Fréchet vicinity.
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2.4. Connectedness. Finally, we need the vicinities to be connected in a partic-
ular way, an abstract way of going from something that is not a heap to something
that is. A V -cover of S is a collection C of subsets of S each of which is a Fréchet
vicinity of some x ∈ S, and containing at least one Fréchet vicinity of each such x.
Two stimuli x, y ∈ S can then be defined to be V -connected if from every V -cover
of S one can choose Fréchet vicinities V1, V2, . . . , Vn such that x ∈ V1, y ∈ Vn, and
Vi ∩ Vi+1 6= ∅ for all i = 1, . . . , n − 1. To formulate a soritical trap one needs the
following connectedness assumption, denoted Con:
there are at least two V-connected stimuli x, y ∈ S such that pi(x) 6= pi(y).
2.5. Putting it all together. It is easy to prove now, as in Dzhafarov and Dzhafarov
(2010a), that Sup, Tol, and Con allow one to construct a classificatory soritical se-
quence, i.e., x1, . . . , xk such that pi(xi) = pi(xi+1) for all i = 1, . . . , n − 1 but
pi(x1) 6= pi(xk). By reductio, Tol and Con cannot hold jointly for any function
pi. Both these assumptions have to be made in order for the existence of soritical
sequences to be guaranteed: dropping either of them makes the system logically
consistent. The assumption Sup cannot be dropped alone, as without it Tol and
Con cannot be formulated.
3. Deterministic Supervenience
3.1. Consistent responses. Let us illustrate the consequences of this analysis
with another example. Max is being presented real numbers between 0 and 1
(inclusive) and asked to classify them as ‘close to 1’ (response r1) or ‘not close to 1’
(response r0). Thus, the set S of stimuli here is the real closed unit interval [0, 1],
and the set R of responses is {r1, r0}. The Fréchet vicinities of x ∈ [0, 1] are defined
in a conventional way, e.g., as (x− ε, x+ ε) ∩ [0, 1] for all possible ε > 0. Any two
x, y in [0, 1] therefore are V-connected.
Suppose first that Max’s responses are consistent, i.e., his choice of r ∈ R is
uniquely determined by the number x ∈ S presented: r = pi(x). (That is, in all
possible worlds Max’s copies always give the same responses to the same stimuli.)
Assume further the following rules of responding:
(M1) there are x0, x1 ∈ S = [0, 1] such that pi(x0) = r0 and pi(x1) = r1;
(M2) if pi(x) = r1, then pi(y) = r1 for all y ≥ x in S;
(M3) if pi(x) = r0, then pi(y) = r0 for all y ≤ x in S.
It immediately follows from these rules that there should exist some v ∈ [0, 1] such
that either pi(x) = r1 if and only if x ∈ [v, 1], or else pi(x) = r1 if and only if
x ∈ (v, 1]. What is more, the value of this v can be (empirically) estimated to
any desired degree of precision, e.g., by the following simple recursive algorithm,
which produces a sequence of rational numbers q0, q1, . . . such that qn is within
2−n of the value of v: let q0 = 0, and given qn for some n ≥ 0, let qn+1 = qn if
r(qn + 2
−(n+1)) = r1, and let qn+1 = qn + 2
−(n+1) otherwise. Unless v happens to
be rational, this is as precise a method of specifying the value of a real number as
possible. We can thus legitimately claim to ‘know’ this value, at least insofar as we
can know the value of most real numbers: we know it in precisely the same way
we know the value of e or
√
2. We therefore cannot see how one can accept that
pi(x) exists and follows Max’s rules, so that the existence of v follows, without also
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accepting the knowability of this v. But this seems to be the epistemic position on
sorites, cf. Sorensen (1988b,a); Williamson (1994, 1997, 2000).
3.2. A rational response. Consider the possibility of trapping a rational person
into the soritical paradox using Max’s rules. The rational person’s name is Alex,
and we present the situation as a conversation between her and Eubulides. First,
Eubulides describes Max’s rules to Alex and asks her to accept them as given. Then
he proceeds.
Eubulides: Will you agree that 1 is close to 1?
Alex: Yes, because it follows from rules M1 and M2.
Eubulides: Will you agree that,
(E1) if x is close to 1 and ε > 0 is sufficiently small, then x− ε
is also close to 1?
And, for symmetry, will you agree that
(E2) if x is not close to 1 and ε > 0 is sufficiently small, then
x+ ε is also not close to 1?
Alex: Let me see. I know that Max’s rules require the existence of a certain
number v such that his responses are determined by one of two rules:
(1) x is close to 1 if and only if x ≥ v, or
(2) x is close to 1 if and only if x > v.
In the first case I agree with E2, because for any x < v, I can always
choose an ε > 0 so that x+ ε < v. But I have to reject E1, because
the statement does not hold for x = v. In the second case, by
analogous reasoning, I agree with E1 but have to reject E2.
Eubulides: We can take the first case without loss of generality, so you agree
with E2. Does it not lead to an increasing sequence in which the
first number is not close to 1, and the second is also not close to 1,
and the third, and so on? And yet since the numbers get larger and
larger, will you not eventually reach a value large enough to be close
to 1?
Alex: Not at all. My acceptance of E2 allows for the ε to depend upon the
x. For every given x < v, I thus choose a positive ε = ε(x) < v − x.
Then the (infinite!) sequence
x,
x+ ε(x),
x+ ε(x) + ε(x+ ε(x)),
...
can never exceed v, so I will deem no number occurring in it as being
close to 1.
Eubulides: But what is this number v? Can you find out its value?
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Alex: Provided Max follows his rules (and you told me he did), then I
know such a v must exist, just as
√
2 exists. As for its value, it is
whatever it is, and if I can ask Max questions, I can approximate it
as accurately as you wish me to.
Put formally, although the system does satisfy Con and although Tol is consistent
with Max’s rules for all x < v, Tol does not hold for x = v, and so Eubulides
must realize he cannot set a soritical trap for Alex. Another way of formalizing the
situation would be to endow S = [0, 1] with unconventional vicinities, e.g., of the
form [x, x + ε) ∩ [0, 1] for every x: in this case no two distinct points in [0, 1] are
V-connected, and a soritical sequence cannot be constructed even if Tol is agreed
to hold throughout [0, 1] (which in this case is equivalent to accepting Eubulides’
E2).
3.3. Conclusion. Why do we not normally see the situation as clearly as Alex
does? Why are we so easily trapped into agreeing that if someone is bald, then
adding a single hair would leave him still bald? It should be clear that if some
heads are bald and some are not, and if baldness is uniquely defined by the number
of hairs, then there should be a transition point in between, and a single added hair
is bound to exceed it. We will discuss a list of reasons for our susceptibility to the
soritical reasoning in the conclusion.
One reason, however, is central for this paper: we are adopting, as a rule of
the game, the assumption Sup, but we do not want to believe in its consequences.
That is, if the function pi in Max’s rules exists, then a boundary point v should
exist too. If one does not want to believe in the existence of such a point, then
Max’s rules should be disbelieved too. Of these rules, M1 is merely a description
of clear-cut cases, and M2 and M3 are merely explicating the meaning of being or
not being close to 1. These rules are difficult not to accept—provided one accepts
the existence of a stimulus-effect function to begin with.
4. Probabilistic Supervenience
4.1. Inconsistent responses. Zora is in almost all respects like Max: her set of
stimuli is S = [0, 1], and to every instance of x she responds by saying r1 or r0.
But these responses pertain to the instances of x rather than the value of x. The
reason for this is that Zora does not assign responses to stimuli consistently. In
the imagined multiverse with an infinity of Zoras responding to x, generally, some
responses will be r1 and some r0. There is, however, a well defined probability of
occurrences of r1 in response to x, which we denote by p(x). Zora’s rules parallel
Max’s, and are as follows:
(Z1) there are x0, x1 ∈ S = [0, 1] such that p(x0) = 0 and p(x1) = 1;
(Z2) the function p(x) is (non-strictly) increasing.
Strictly speaking, the stimulus-effect function pi(x) in this setting is the probability
distribution
pi(x) =
[
r1 r0
p(x) 1− p(x)
]
,
but since this is determined entirely by p(x), we can view p as the stimulus-effect
function instead.
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4.2. A rational response. Can a soritical trap be set based on Zora’s rules? Let
us invite Alex and Eubilides again.
Eubulides: I have just described to you Zora’s rules. Please accept them. Will
you agree that p(1) = 1 and p(0) = 0?
Alex: Yes, it follows from Z1 and Z2.
Eubulides: Will you agree that,
(E3) if x ∈ [0, 1] and ε > 0 is sufficiently small, then p(x± ε) =
p(x)?
Alex: No. This may be true for some x, but cannot be true for all x. If
it were, then the function would have to be constant on the entire
interval [0, 1], which is impossible since p(1) 6= p(0).
This short dialogue establishes that p(x) is not tolerant, i.e., the system does not
satisfy Tol, whence one cannot form a soritical sequence.
It would not help if one used a discretization of p(x), e.g., by defining a new
probability function p˜ by p˜(x) = 1 if p(x) ≥ 1/2, and p˜(x) = 0 otherwise. This
would effectively reduce Zora’s rules to Max’s (Cargile, 1969).
4.3. Conclusion. Let us formulate two informal hypotheses (or more correctly,
guiding principles) about the world (or about behaviors in the world). The first
one is the hypothesis that lack of supervenience means the system behaves proba-
bilistically.
(∼ Sup ≡ Prob) All empirical systems that violate the assumption of superve-
nience behave probabilistically.
The precise meaning of this hypothesis is this: when responses from set R do not
supervene on stimuli from set S, then there is a sigma-algebraΣ on R and a function
λ : S →M(R,Σ),
where M(R,Σ) is the set of all probability measures on the measure space (R,Σ).
Thus, if Zora finds out that her responses r0 and r1 are not determined uniquely by
points in [0, 1], then she knows that every point of [0, 1] is mapped into a probability
distribution uniquely described by p(x). Of course, supervenience is merely a special
case of probabilistic behavior, with p(x) attaining only the values 0 and 1. In view
of this the hypothesis can also be formulated thus: all empirical systems behave
probabilistically.
The second hypothesis is that lack of supervenience is ubiquitous in all situations
where one is likely to construct a soritical trap.
(∼ Sup) In all empirical systems where the assumption of supervenience is not
accompanied by plausible identifiability of non-tolerance points or a
plausible explanation of non-connectedness, the supervenience assump-
tion is violated.
Because of the vague term ‘plausible’, this hypothesis is not a well-formed scientific
statement. The only reason for stating it here in this imperfect form is that we are
not concerned with the exact sphere of applicability of this hypothesis. Rather, we
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are interested in the possibility of using this hypothesis in specific situations, when
the non-deterministic nature of a behavior (lack of the kind of supervenience enjoyed
by Max) can be empirically demonstrated. The hypothesis ∼ Sup essentially says
such situations are ubiquitous. Probabilistic supervenience therefore should be
viewed as the first and simplest way of dissolving soritical traps. For a similar view
in the literature, see Hardin (1988).
5. Anticipating objections
5.1. Probabilistic predicates versus truth values. The use of probabilistic
supervenience may appear to be just a variant of the degrees-of-truth or fuzzy sets
approach to sorites (Black, 1937; Edgington, 1997), according to which, for some
predicates Π∗ defined for all x ∈ S, the statements ‘Π∗(x)’ have non-classical truth
values: not just True or False, but any number between 0 and 1. Let us denote this
number by TV[Π∗(x)]. Let us assume a correspondence between a stimulus-effect
function pi and a ‘real-world’ predicate Π∗ can be established. For instance, Zora’s
stimulus-effect function
p(x) = Pr[Zora says x is close to 1]
can be paired with the vague predicate
P ∗(x) ≡ x is close to 1.
This pairing is far from obvious, as we do not know what being ‘in reality’ close to
1 means, and we do not know if Zora’s understanding of this predicate accords with
any normative rules (except for her own rules, Z1 and Z2). If, however, we overlook
this difficulty, is it a tenable view that the truth of p(x) equalling p is equivalent to
TV[P ∗(x)] equalling p?
The answer to this question is negative. To see this, consider the following. For
every x, y within the domain S, we have
(True[p(x) = p] and True[p(y) = q]) iff True[p(x) = p ∧ p(y) = q].
But (using Łukasiewicz and Tarski’s many-valued logic rules, cf. Hájek (2003)), if
conjunction is understood in the weak sense then we have
(TV[P ∗(x)] = p and TV[P ∗(y)] = q) implies TV[P ∗(x) ∧ P ∗(y)] = min{p, q},
whereas if conjunction is understood in the strong sense then
(TV[P ∗(x)] = p and TV[P ∗(y)] = q) implies TV[P ∗(x)∧P ∗(y)] = max{0, p+q−1}.
Another example: by the rules of classical calculus of propositions,
if True[p(y) = q] then True(p(x) = p⇒ p(y) = q),
irrespective of whether True[p(x) = p] or False[p(x) = p]. But
if (TV[P ∗(x)] = p and TV[P ∗(y)] = q) then TV[p(x)⇒ p(y)] = min{1, 1− p+ q}.
On the other hand, there is one useful parallel between the two approaches. If
P
∗
(x) is understood as the internal negation of P ∗(x), and if we associate it with
1− p(x) = Pr[Zora says x is not close to 1],
we have
TV[P ∗(x)] = p iff TV[P
∗
(x)] = 1− p.
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5.2. Higher-Order Probabilities? There is an equivocation in using the term
‘response’. When Max or Zora respond to an instance of x by r1, as being ‘close
to 1’, the latter is a response. But only for Max is it also a stimulus-effect, in the
sense of supervening on x. For Zora it is not: her stimulus-effect is the probability
p(x) of saying r1. This distinction is the reason we use the term ‘stimulus-effect’ as
separate from ‘response’. It is, however, always possible, whatever stimulus-effect
is being considered, to view it as a response consistently given to every instance of
x. Thus, if Max instead of r0 or r1 responded to every instance of x by saying ‘r’,
where r is some number between 0 and 1, it would be equivalent to Zora saying
p(x) = r.
The question arises: if this is a possible point of view, could not then the as-
signment of probability distributions to stimuli be subject to probabilistic consid-
erations of their own? Indeed, the new Max who responds to every instance of x
by a number between 0 and 1 may be found to do this inconsistently, and then, by
our hypothesis ∼ Sup ≡ Prob, he should be behaving probabilistically. This would
entail a probability distribution on [0, 1], for every value of x. This distribution can
be described by a distribution function
Ax(r) = Pr[(new) Max chooses a number ≤ r for this instance of x],
for all r ∈ [0, 1] and x ∈ [0, 1]. Could not the same reasoning apply to a new
Zora whose probabilities of responding r1 are not consistent? This would mean the
following analogue of the distribution function above:
Zx(r) =Pr[(new) Zora responds to an instance of x by saying r1
with a probability ≤ r],
for all r ∈ [0, 1] and x ∈ [0, 1].
Here, however, the analogy ends. Max and new Max do respond very differently,
but new Zora is merely Zora with a different probability function p(x). Indeed,
probability p(x) changing in accordance with Zx(r) is merely a new probability
function
p˜(x) =
ˆ
rdZx(r),
which is the expected value of r distributed in accordance with Zx(r). The prob-
ability of Zora saying r1 in response to x, if it changes probabilistically, is merely
another probability of Zora saying r1 in response to x. In other words, under our
hypotheses the probabilities of observable responses always supervene on stimuli.
We never need probabilities of probabilities. The general statement is
Theorem (Woodbury-Savage Reduction). A probability distribution of probability
measures on a measure space (R,Σ) is equivalent to a measure on the measure space
(R,Σ).
This version is a trivial generalization of the theorem given in Savage (1972). The
equivalence is understood in the sense of implying one and the same probability
with which r ∈ R falls within every measurable subset E of R. The proof obtains
by denoting the ‘second-order’ probability measure µ(λ), where λ is an ordinary
(‘first-order’) probability measure on (R,Σ), and observing that
Pr[r ∈ E] =
ˆ
λ(E)dµ(λ)
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(in the Lebesgue sense). One can easily check that this probability, taken over all
E ∈ Σ, is a well-formed probability measure on (R,Σ).
Example. Suppose we are handed one of two coins to flip, Coin 1 with Pr[head] = p
and Coin 2 with Pr[head] = q, and suppose we are handed Coin 1 with probability
r. Then the probability with which the outcome of a given toss will be ‘head’ will
be the same as that of flipping a single coin having
Pr[head] = p× r + q × (1− r).
After all, a single fair coin (Pr[head] = 0.5) can very well be conceptualized in this
way with p = 1, q = 0, and r = 0.5 (i.e., both sides of Coin 1 are heads, both sides
of Coin 2 are tails, and we are handed Coin 1 exactly half the time).
The reduction argument, mutatis mutandis, has been repeated in the philosoph-
ical literature numerously (Kyburg, 2013; Pearl, 2013). The opinion in favor of
‘higher-order’ distributions (see, e.g., Hansson, 2008) is based on a logical confu-
sion. If the alternation of Coin 1 and Coin 2 in our example is arranged in a series,
e.g., each occurrence being tied to a particular point in time (or according to any
other way of tagging individual occurrences), then the pattern of changes in time
can be detected, or at least theoretically considered. This change of probabilities
in time, however, is not a probability distribution of probabilities. One can speak
of such a distribution at any given moment, but then by the reasoning above it
can always be replaced by a single probability. One will have therefore a proba-
bility, say Zora’s p(x), developing in time, i.e., treated as a function p(x, t) giving
the probability of r1 as a function of x and t. In this case, t should simply be in-
cluded within the description of the stimuli x (i.e., the domain of the system should
properly consist of pairs (x, t)).
6. Rule-making
6.1. Normative rules. We turn now to how one sets up normative rules that
make the behavior of anyone following these rules completely predictable. Max’s
rules, e.g., do not fall in this category. They are under-definitive in the following
sense: while they compel anyone following them to construct the stimulus-effect
function pi in a particular way (r1 up to some point v, r2 thereafter), they do not
determine this function uniquely. Zora’s rules are under-definitive with respect to
probabilities because they allow different people to use different functions p(x),
requiring only that these functions be monotonic and attain the value 0 and 1 at,
respectively, x = 0 and x = 1.
For simplicity, we will focus on Max’s rules in our discussion of rule-making. Let
Max, Alex, and Zora come together to determine a definitive form of these rules.
They know that the stimulus effect function is
pi(x) =


r0 if x < v
r if x = v
r1 if x > v
where v can be any number in [0, 1], and r is either r0 or r1 (constrained by the
stipulations r = r0 if v = 0, and r = r1 if v = 1). How do they make the choices?
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6.2. Arbitrariness. We begin by observing that the procedure of deciding on v
and r can very well be viewed as behavior, albeit very specific behavior. There
is a single stimulus here, the interval [0, 1] to be partitioned, and for something
to supervene on it simply means this something should be uniquely determined.
In the real world, if one were to investigate rule-making behavior of this kind
one would have to form many similar triads of people and observe their decisions.
In our multiverse picture, we think of an infinity of worlds with Max-Alex-Zora
triads making these decisions. Their decision is represented by the pair (v, r).
Since there is nothing known to us that would compel all these triads of rule-
makers to make the same choice, we can invoke our hypothesis ∼ Sup ≡ Prob
to assert that (v, r) is chosen probabilistically. This means that there is a single
probability distribution of the (v, r)s, and therefore that this distribution supervenes
on the single stimulus [0, 1]. (We know that this solution is stable: any probability
distribution of the probability distributions of the (v, r)s is equivalent to a single
probability distribution of the (v, r)s.)
It may, however, be more interesting for a philosopher to consider what decision
Max, Alex, and Zora ought to make rather than what decisions they do make. Is
there some way of determining, based on Max’s rules alone, what the choice of (v, r)
ought to be? The obvious answer is no: the choice is entirely arbitrary. There is
nothing in the rules known to Max, Alex, and Zora that would make, say, (1/2, r1)
a better choice than any other choice of (v, r), let alone the only possible choice.
Max, Alex, and Zora are in the position of Buridan’s ass surrounded by an infinity
of identical hay stacks. We submit that the arbitrariness of the choices involved
may be one of the main reasons for the uncanny persuasiveness of sorites.
6.3. Justification. It seems likely to us that people who erroneously accept the
universality of the soritical step in the classical soritical traps with heaps and bald-
ness may do so because they are correctly aware of their inability to justify any
precise rules about baldness and heaps. People find it difficult (perhaps, impos-
sible) to make choices arbitrarily. People want justifications, and when they do
not have any they cast lots and consult spirits. Alex, in her conversations with
Eubulides, may very well understand that she cannot accept the universality of the
soritical step because she knows that a boundary v must exist. Max, Alex, and
Zora together can make the rule that v is to be set to 3/4, yet not be aware of any
principle (law of nature, convention) to justify this rule or to prevent setting v to
3001/4000. They realize they are unlikely to find a foundation for their rule that
would not itself be equally unfounded, and as a result they correctly think v could
very well be changed to 3001/4000, or, for that matter, to 1/8. The smallness of
the change is not significant, and serves merely to remind them that their rule must
be precise.
6.4. Correctness. Arbitrariness of choices means also they cannot be wrong or
right. Epistemicists (Keefe, 2000; Sorensen, 1988b; Williamson, 1994, 1997, 2000)
disagree with this: they seem to consider the task of setting a v between 0 and 1
as a discovery of something that objectively exists, and even uniquely exists. In
other words, for them there must be a ‘correct’ boundary (v, r) within the interval
[0, 1] between the numbers close to 1 and those not close to 1. We do not see why
this should be the case (joining in this respect other authors, e.g., Gómez-Torrente
(1997), Tye (1997)). As mentioned in Section 3, in cases where responses supervene
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on stimuli, we do not see why one cannot learn (or approximate) the position of a
true boundary. But in cases where, somehow, we fundamentally cannot know the
value of a true boundary, we do not see how an objective ‘correctness’ of such a
boundary can be justified. Is this not like arguing that because a newborn child
will eventually have a name, and because this is a fact about the future and as
such holds even before the baby is named, there should already at that point be an
objectively right or wrong name that the baby ought to be given?
There is, however, one aspect about which the epistemic position seems to be
indisputable. Even if v is known to us with arbitrary precision but not precisely,
we can never learn whether pi(v) is r1 or r0. The knowledge of pi(v) is conditioned
upon the knowledge of v, and the latter cannot be achieved by observations (even by
the idealized observations of an infinity of Maxes in parallel worlds). The question
to ask here is whether this determination matters for predicting or understanding
Max’s behavior. If the difference between pi(v) = r0 and pi(v) = r1 has observable
consequences, then the true choice can be made based on them. But this will lead
us outside Max’s rules and the description of x as the only stimulus given in this
task.
Supervaluationists (Dummett (1975); Fine (1975); (Keefe, 2000, Chapters 7,8))
accept the fact of arbitrariness. The Max example is very similar to Kit Fine’s
example with nice1: if we rename ‘close to 1’ into ‘nice1’, then we know that 1
is ‘nice1’, that 0 is ‘not nice1’, and all the numbers in between can be labeled by
‘nice1’ and ‘not nice1’ arbitrarily (within the constraints of rules M2 and M3). We
cannot, however, see a reason for the supervaluationist insistence on considering
all possible labelings. From a logical point of view, this is the only correct way
of looking at the situation if the goal of looking at it is to find out propositions
that preserve their truth value under all possible choices. But one can be equally
interested in propositions that are true under some choices of labelings, or even
under one specific such choice.
7. Conclusion: Why is sorites psychologically persuasive?
7.1. Summary. It seems that the classificatory sorites is not a very complex is-
sue. When faced with a soritical trap, one has first to examine the assumption of
supervenience. If it holds, then either tolerance or connectedness have to be re-
jected. If supervenience does not hold, then a soritical trap cannot be formulated.
But one can assume then that the assignments are probabilistic and supervenience
applies to the probabilities. A soritical trap then cannot be formulated as in the
first case. If one has to make a deterministic rule, one is faced with the necessity
of making arbitrary choices. These choices are unjustifiable (otherwise they would
not be arbitrary), but unavoidable and rational.
7.2. Theorizing about sorites. Why is then sorites is considered such a very
hard problem (Priest (2004); Varzi (2003))?
Note that no soritical traps exist for the hypothetical Max or Zora who answer
questions like ‘is this number close to 1, yes or no’? The supervening effect of
the responses in their respective cases (deterministic and probabilistic), and the
boundary v in Max’s, can be determined. The trap only exists for someone who, like
Alex, theorizes about the performance of Max and Zora. In effect, Alex is supposed
to construct a theory of sorites in her mind and explicate all the assumptions
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involved. This is indeed not trivial. (At least not for us, trying to do so in this
paper).
We have pointed to two main sources of difficulty in theorizing about sorites. The
first is that deterministic supervenience is implicitly assumed in the formulation of
a soritical trap, but Alex is asked to rely on her intuition concerning notions which
real behavior does not supervene on—it only behaves probabilistically. And this
is not just human behavior applied to vague notions. Borrowing an example from
Dzhafarov and Dzhafarov (2010a), a big rusty two-pan balance with a fixed weight
in the left pan and a variable weight x in the right (the stimulus, in the behavioral
approach) may be at equilibrium or it may tip right or left (the response). Can the
addition or deletion of a single atom upset the balance, causing it to tip? One’s
intuition revolts against the idea of something big and clumsy being sensitive to
microscopic changes, but the revolt is likely to be pacified if one realizes that as
the balance approaches the state of unstable equilibrium its behavior must become
probabilistic. Can the probability of the balance tipping to the right increase as a
result of adding a single atom to x? Yes, of course, by a very small amount. The
reduction theorem of Section 5.2 and the fact that deterministic behavior is merely
a special case of probabilistic make the probabilistic dissolution of sorites both firm
and universally applicable.
The second difficulty with sorites pointed out in this paper is that a theorist who
tries to make a rule relating something like the notion ‘bald’ to hypothetical stimuli
(the number of hairs) is thinking about the justifiability of the possible rules when,
in fact, there are none as the situation is truly arbitrary. A logical fallacy is then
committed, as the lack of justification for specifying any given boundary is being
mistaken for the impossibility of doing so. If our task is to send three different
postcards to Max, Alex, and Zora, but our instructions do not specify whom to
send which postcard to, the rational behavior is to arbitrarily choose among the six
possible versions. A ‘correct’ choice does not exist. If one considers rule-making
as special behavior, then our identical copies in the parallel worlds should send the
postcard in all six different ways (with possibly unequal probabilities, indicating
various biases on our part).
These two reasons for soritical persuasiveness are definitely not the only ones.
There are purely psychological reasons one may commit logical fallacies on account
of. Thus, Williamson (1997) correctly points out that a person asked to judge the
truth of ‘If a head is not bald, then removing one hair would not make it bald’ may
replace the antecedent with ‘If a head has lots of hairs’, confusing the notion of ‘not
bald’ with that of ‘typical person who is not bald’. But we do not wish to get into
psychological reasons like this.
7.3. Classificatory versus comparative sorites. We do, however, wish to ad-
dress another possible reason, namely, the logical confusion of the classificatory
sorites with the comparative one. The formal difference between the two is the
following. In the classificatory sorites we have an arbitrary set of stimuli S, an
arbitrary set of stimulus-effects R, and the function pi mapping S into R. A clas-
sificatory soritical sequence x1, . . . , xn cannot exist in classical logic because it is
contradictory: if pi(xi) = pi(xi+1) for all i = 1, . . . , n − 1, then it is impossible to
have pi(x1) 6= pi(xn). In the comparative sorites we have pairs of stimuli from S×S
and only two (fixed) possible responses, ‘same’ and ‘different’. Assuming the super-
venience of these responses on the pairs of stimuli, a comparative soritical sequence
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is x1, . . . , xn such that (xi, xi+1) are mapped to ‘same’ for all i = 1, . . . , n− 1, yet
(x1, xn) is mapped to ‘different’. Here, unlike in the classificatory sorites, there is
no logical contradiction, and the possibility of a soritical sequence depends on the
definition of ‘same’ and ‘different’. If one defines two numbers to be ‘same’ if they
differ by no more than 0.5, and ‘different’ otherwise, then a comparative soritical
sequence can be readily constructed (say, x1 = 0, x2 = 0.4, x3 = 0.8). If one defines
two numbers (between 0 and 1) to be ‘same’ just when they have the same first 5
digits in their decimal expansion, then a comparative soritical sequence does not
exist.
The confusion in question occurs when one explains the necessity of the classifi-
catory soritical step by the fact that one cannot distinguish two sufficiently similar
stimuli. But this does not apply to the classical sorites involving baldness and
heap, nor to our Max and Zora examples. A number x is assumed to be known to
the respondents (and to Alex theorizing about the responders) precisely, and the
equality x = y is understood as precise equality, not approximate one.
The explanation through comparative sorites could plausibly work in what is
called ‘observational’ sorites: e.g., if Aliya is asked to judge whether a given color
patch is ‘red’ or ‘not red’, she may be thought (by Alex, theorizing about her own
performance) to be unable to tell apart two very similar shades of color—so that
however she might understand ‘red’, she will have to give the same response to both
these shades of color. Even for the observational situations, however, the explana-
tion in question is dubious. It hinges on a specific understanding of the comparative
sorites for which we do not have any empirical evidence (and observational sorites is,
of course, about empirical situations). In real human behavior (or the behavior of
a technical gadget), responses like ‘same’ and ‘different’ do not supervene on stim-
ulus pairs if they involve very close stimuli. It is a fundamental empirical fact that
sometimes people (or gadgets) will judge (x, x) as ‘different’ and (x, x+ε) as ‘same’.
One cannot simultaneously eliminate ‘errors’ of these two types. If one takes into
account the probabilistic nature of supervenience here and computes the matching
relations between stimuli as characteristics of the probability distributions, compar-
ative soritical sequences become less than obvious. Carefully collected experimental
evidence seems to be in favor of the hypothesis of Dzhafarov and Dzhafarov (2010b)
that comparative soritical sequences do not exist (Dzhafarov and Perry, 2010, 2014;
Dzhafarov and Colonius, 2006).
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